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Abstract. The Grenfell Tower fire has brought the regulatory system that permitted
combustible materials on high-rise buildings in England into question. At the heart of
that system is the BS 8414 test, and the BR 135 criteria used to demonstrate compli-
ance with the Building Regulations. The test is empirical and the criteria arbitrary:
there is no scientific link between test performance and how a building will perform
in the event of a fire; nor any detailed analysis of why fires spread through fac¸ade
systems which have passed the test. Following the Grenfell tragedy, the UK govern-
ment commissioned a series of tests on Grenfell Tower-type facades, using BS 8414.
This paper critically analyses BS 8414, the BR 135 criteria and the government tests.
It shows that important aspects of the standard are poorly defined: the heat flux
imposed on the fac¸ade is not measured and the fire load can vary by at least a factor
of 2; the ambient ventilation has a significant impact on the thermal attack but is not
adequately controlled; judicious location of the cavity barriers can confer compliance
or failure on a fac¸ade system. As the vehicle for allowing combustible products on
tall buildings, the test does not specify the extent of cavity barrier deployment, while
ignoring features present in real buildings, such as windows, vents or other openings,
despite a test rig height of more than 8 m. There is no restriction on debris, or mol-
ten or burning droplets falling from the fac¸ade during the test. The BR 135 criteria
only specify that the test must run for the full 60 min duration without flames reach-
ing the top, and the temperature rise at thermocouples 5 m above the fire chamber
must only remain below 600C for the first 15 min. It is unclear how the fire safety of
the occupants behind the fac¸ade system can be ensured, when the criteria specify such
a high temperature for such a short period, so early in the test. There is no direct
connection between the fac¸ade system in the test and the actual fac¸ade system the
results deem compliant. Worse, ‘‘desktop studies’’, using large-scale test data, have
been allowed to confer compliance on systems which have never been subject to the
test. The UK government tests used heavy-duty welded aluminium ‘‘window pods’’,
preventing flames from entering the cavity within the fac¸ade. They also used a dis-
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proportionately large number of vertical and horizontal cavity barriers of a higher
specification than required by statutory guidance. These aids to meeting the criteria
are not proscribed by BS 8414-1 but are not commonly found in actual rainscreen
system designs.
Keywords: Facade, regulation, BS 8414, combustible, testing, fire
1. Introduction
The fire that destroyed the Grenfell Tower and took 72 lives, in London in June
2017, spread rapidly around an external, combustible rainscreen fac¸ade system [1,
2].
Following that tragedy, the UK’s existing multi-storey housing is in crisis
because of the uncertainties around their fire safety: it is no longer clear which
combinations of which fac¸ade products are compliant with the UK building regu-
lations [3]. An ongoing government survey of fac¸ades of high-rise residential
buildings in both the private and public sectors identified 454 buildings taller than
18 m that were known to have highly combustible aluminium composite material
(ACM) on the external walls. To date, 114 have completed the remediation works
and are considered likely to meet Building Regulations [3]. Buildings, similar to
Lakanal House (a London tower block where six people died in a fire in 2009),
which have combustible high-pressure laminate (HPL) panels (wood-fibre bound
with a phenol–formaldehyde resin); timber-clad buildings; or the large number of
multi-storey buildings with combustible foam insulation, faced with a thin render
of fibre reinforced cement (External Thermal Insulation Composite Systems,
ETICS), in the place of ACM, have yet to be considered. The UK government [4]
estimated that 600 high-rise buildings with combustible fac¸ades need to be
approved each year.
The UK’s regulatory framework for fire safety of buildings is performance-
based. For example, in England, Schedule 1 of the Building Regulations (2010),
Section B4 (1), covering prevention of external fire spread, states, ‘‘the external
walls of the building shall adequately resist the spread of fire over the walls and
from one building to another, having regard to the height, use and position of the
building’’. Photographs and video footage demonstrate that the walls of Grenfell
Tower did not resist the spread of fire; and has now been found to not comply
with this regulation [5].
However, guidance as to how this performance-based regulation may be met is
given in the UK government’s 180 page Fire Safety: Approved Document B [6]
(AD B). AD B explains that this can be achieved by the use of non-combustible
products on the outside walls of the building, or by meeting certain criteria based
on large-scale test results. It can also be met through the use of fire safety engi-
neering.
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1.1. Different Scales of Test
Non-combustibility is typically assessed on a microgram to gram-scale, for exam-
ple, by rapid oxidation in a bomb calorimeter, in 25 bar of oxygen, or a non-com-
bustibility apparatus (EN ISO 1182) which employs a cylindrical specimen of
diameter 45 mm and height of 50 mm by observing flaming or quantifying tem-
perature rise in a furnace at 750C. These tests are robust in that they will ensure
that any material which could burn in a fire will not meet the non-combustibility
requirement. They are also quick and cheap to run, with excellent interlaboratory
reproducibility.
Bench-scale tests usually involve flaming combustion, typically burning under a
controlled set of conditions at a fixed heat flux, while continuously recording data
on heat release and burning behaviour. These are most widely used for material
development, and to provide input of burning behaviour in models of large-scale
fires [7]. They are also used for regulatory testing. While showing lower repeata-
bility and reproducibility than the micro- or gram-scale tests, their reproducibility
is greater than that of large-scale tests, and much more information is available
from a heat release curve than a single pass/fail result. In the UK, an alternative
to the Euroclass B criteria [8] for flammability of fac¸ade products was the UK
class O. This required a pass in BS 476 part 6 and Class 1 performance in part 7.
Both tests clamp a flat sample, of 0.05 m2 and 0.25 m2 respectively, in a non-com-
bustible holder, and expose it to a radiative heat flux, and pilot ignition source.
When materials such as the polyethylene-filled aluminium composite panels, that
drove the rapid fire spread on Grenfell Tower are tested, since the aluminium
panel face is non-combustible, if the polyethylene is able to drip away from the
flame entirely, it will meet the test criteria; if it flows into the flame it will ignite
and fail. Indeed, it could be argued that the popularity of aluminium composite
panels in the UK was linked to the test regime in place—while losing sight of the
real fire performance of the product.
The single burning item (SBI) test (EN 13823), designed for Euroclassification
of internal wall-lining products, is an intermediate scale test. A 30 kW propane
burner is situated in an internal corner of two faces of product, 1.5 m high and
1 m and 0.5 m wide. It covers classifications from A2 to D, based on the fire
growth rate (FIGRA), the total heat release during minute 5 to minute 15 of the
test (THR600) and the maximum flame spread. Additional classifications cover
smoke (SMOGRA), total smoke production during minute 5 to minute 15 of the
test (TSP600) and burning droplets/particles. Although the SBI is a smaller scale, it
could be argued that it is more robust than some larger scale tests, in that classifi-
cation depends on three replicate tests meeting defined thresholds in quantitative
heat release and flame spread data. It has been used to assess the fire performance
of external products such as fac¸ade panels, tested as individual components.
Before the Grenfell Tower fire, polyethylene-filled aluminium composite panels
were reported to have met Euroclass B, but after the fire, through the system of
notified bodies, other test laboratories found the same product only achieved
Euroclass C and D in their tests, so the original certificate was withdrawn. There
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are many other intermediate scale tests for wall-lining and fac¸ade products,
including the 2.4 m tall ISO 13785-1 test.
Large-scale tests have the potential advantages of involving larger ignition sour-
ces, have a larger area of fac¸ade, and hence fuel, to involve in a potential confla-
gration, and can reduce the scale differences of products manufactured for large
fac¸ades (e.g. insulation boards 150 mm thick, or ACM with 0.5 mm aluminium
sheet sandwiching 3 mm of polyethylene). They claim to be more representative of
the real fire scenario (such as a fac¸ade fire ignited by a post-flashover apartment
or burning rubbish skip). These tests are the focus of this paper.
1.2. The UK Combustibles Ban
In December 2018, an additional requirement was added to the Building Regula-
tions for England, which control the presence of combustible materials on the
external walls of certain buildings with a storey above a height of 18 m. These
include residential blocks of flats, student accommodation, care homes, sheltered
housing, hospitals, and dormitories in boarding schools, but not hotels or offices.
However, the ban is not retrospective, and only applies to properties built or
refurbished after February 2019, and those undergoing a change of use (i.e. those
buildings that become residential, and institutional buildings where previously
they were not). The amended regulations are currently under review, [9] so the
topic is particularly pertinent to the fire safety of tall residential buildings in the
UK.
1.3. Regulations for Tall Buildings not Covered by the Ban
For external wall construction of buildings over 18 m not captured by the new
regulation, the latest edition of AD B specifies the use of insulation of Euroclass
A2 or better, and external wall surface classification of Euroclass B, or better
(known as ‘‘the direct route to compliance’’). Alternatively, a fac¸ade system that
satisfies the criteria of BR 135 following a large-scale fac¸ade fire test carried out
as specified in BS 8414 is also deemed acceptable. BS 8414 describes a pair of
large-scale tests, between 8 and 9 m tall, involving a developed fire impinging on
the external face of a fac¸ade system which incorporates an internal corner. The
2006 edition of AD B and the 2019 edition covering non-residential buildings pro-
vide a route for compliance with the Building Regulations by meeting the perfor-
mance criteria given in BR 135 for external walls using full-scale test data from
BS 8414-1 or BS 8414-2. The phrase ‘‘test data’’, allows ‘‘desktop studies’’ to be
used where the large-scale test result for that fac¸ade system is not available. This
has led to widespread criticism of the England’s fire safety regulations. BS 8414
was developed by BRE in response to real fac¸ade fires. In BS 8414-1 [10], the
internal corner is made by two fire resistant masonry walls on which the fac¸ade
system under test is installed. Such fac¸ades are often used for refurbishment of
existing, concrete-walled buildings. BS 8414-2 [11] uses a steel framework lined by
plasterboard on the inside, onto which a wall corner system is mounted: this test
relates to more modern, steel-framed constructions.
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BR 135: Fire Performance of external thermal insulation for walls of multistorey
buildings [12], is a document written by BRE Global (now a private company, but
until 1997 was the UK government’s Building Research Establishment). Annex A
and B: performance criteria and classification method for BS 8414-1 and BS 8414-2
set out criteria to determine whether a particular fac¸ade system meets the UK
building regulations, based on the results of testing according to the BS 8414 stan-
dard. The BS 8414 test and the criteria in BR 135 are the route which allows
combustible materials to be used in the construction of external walls of high-rise
buildings. The construction of the fac¸ade is the responsibility of the test sponsor,
who also provides a description of the fac¸ade system for the classification report.
The results of a BS 8414 test should be documented in a fire test report, for a
specific fac¸ade system. In the UK, these results are then compared to the criteria
of BR 135, and if they have been met, a separate BR 135 classification report is
issued for that fac¸ade system. In addition, variants of BS 8414 are used in Aus-
tralia, Belgium, China, United Arab Emirates and Ireland. A derivative of the test
is currently undergoing evaluation by the European Commission as the fac¸ade test
to be adopted within the Construction Products Regulation [13].
1.4. Fac¸ade Fires and their Relationship to Large-Scale Fire Tests
Fac¸ade fires are of great interest to the fire safety community, internationally. As
early as 1996, Babrauskas [14] warned of ‘‘the very serious consequences that can
result when fire does propagate over the fac¸ade of a high-rise building’’. More
recently, the editorial [15] of a special issue of this journal (Fire Technology), on
the fire safety of high-rise buildings highlighted the extensive use of external
fac¸ade insulation materials bringing new fire safety issues. A year later the edito-
rial of a special edition of Fire and Materials [16] also highlighted the number of
recent incidents which involve extensive fac¸ade fires.
Following the Grenfell Tower fire, Babrauskas [17] argued strongly for the need
for science to underpin large-scale fire tests used to ensure the fire safety of build-
ing fac¸ades. Apart from a handful of micro- and bench-scale tests for assessing
heats of combustion, these are purely empirical and hence the results are only
valid for the test scenario itself. Babrauskas pointed out that numerous studies of
fac¸ade fire disasters have been written, but none had been related to the tests used
to allow the fac¸ade system in the first place. In a detailed consideration of fac¸ade
fires, Bonner and Rein [18] argue that if an engineering ‘‘flammability index’’ exis-
ted for fac¸ades, they could be better optimised to meet both fire safety and ther-
mal insulation criteria. The ‘‘flammability index’’ concept has subsequently been
developed, using a database of over 250 Polish tests, on rainscreen, ETICS and
sandwich panel fac¸ades, providing information on the fire performance of differ-
ent types of fac¸ade product and design [19].
1.5. Other Fac¸ade Tests
The European Construction Products Directive and subsequently Regulations
(CPR) [20] aimed to eliminate barriers to trade across Europe through a har-
monised system of performance testing of construction products. They have been
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operational for over 20 years. In assessing fire performance, they use somewhat
different test protocols for different product classes. Despite fac¸ade products being
recognised as a separate product class since the CPR’s inception, only recently
have fac¸ade test methods been proposed for incorporation into the European sys-
tem. A European Commission (EC) funded study has recently been published [21]
on means to regulate the fire performance of fac¸ade systems. They identify a lack
of scientific data relating to key performance characteristics, such as heat exposure
of the test specimen for the various test methods; whether tests are conducted out-
side or within laboratory buildings; and acknowledge the trade-off between the
range of applications represented by a particular test result and the test burden
needed to cover a wider range. In addition to the intermediate-scale SBI test, they
identify around 10 larger scale test methods used by member states to assess the
fire performance of fac¸ade systems. Since the EC are currently considering use of
the BS 8414, alongside DIN 4102-20 test, the discussion in this paper is particu-
larly timely.
There are several large-scale fire fac¸ade tests in use globally. The most impor-
tant have been compared in Table 1, showing the key parameters. All the fac¸ade
tests shown in the table relate to a scenario in which flames emerge from a post-
flashover compartment onto the fac¸ade, originating from a single fire source,
except NFPA 285, which uses two fire sources. ISO 13785, BS 8414, and DIN
4102-20 all have two walls in an internal L-shape, while NFPA 285 and SP FIRE
105 have a single wall. In addition, SP FIRE 105 also has a ‘‘fictitious’’ window
opening above the fire compartment.
Anderson et al. [22] compared the fuel source in BS 8141-1 and the Nordic
fac¸ade test, SP Fire 105. While BS 8141-1 uses a volume of wood, SP Fire 105
uses a volume of heptane. In SP 105 the heat flux is measured and used for con-
trol, in BS 8414 the heat exposure to the fac¸ade surface is uncontrolled, and it
may differ from test to test due to factors such as timber variation and air move-
ments around the combustion chamber. They showed that air movements around
the test set-up (the wind) had a significant impact on either test.
The aim of this paper is to provide an assessment of the current test method,
BS 8414, the criteria for compliance in BR 135, and of the post-Grenfell UK gov-
ernment tests.
2. The BS 8414-1 Fac¸ade Test
Early research into the UK’s regime for large scale fac¸ade testing was undertaken
by the Fire Research Station, now part of BRE, in 1994 [23]. The original testing
regime proposed in 1994 incorporates many features which have been omitted
from the BS 8414 tests. It was 4 storeys tall, with a combustion chamber at the
base, and 3 window openings on the storeys above. The top detail of the combus-
tion chamber was identical to the top of the window openings. The power output
was quantified as a function of time, through the mass loss of the wood crib, and
heat flux was measured 1 m above the combustion chamber and at the first-floor
window. The failure criteria included reaching a temperature of 400C, rather
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than the 600C of the current test, flames reaching the second floor, and debris
falling from the fac¸ade. The following statement appeared in the summary. ‘‘In
assessing the fire hazard, it was found that the design, detailing and construction
of the complete cladding system is more important than the reaction to fire prop-
erties of the individual materials involved. Consequently, it is suggested that the
fire hazard be determined by testing the complete cladding system as in practice.’’
Unfortunately, this rigorous test protocol has lost many of its key features in the
development of the current BS 8414 tests.
Figure 1 shows the current, BS 8414-1 test set up, dimensions and location of
thermocouples. The test rig consists of a main face (masonry wall), with an aper-
ture for the combustion chamber, adjoining a wing (second masonry wall) form-
ing an internal corner. The fac¸ade system is attached to the walls, leaving an
opening in front of the combustion chamber. The standard lacks specificity in key
areas.
The post-flashover room with flames billowing out of the window onto the
fac¸ade in a real building is replicated by the combustion chamber in the test. In
stark contrast to the original 1994 fac¸ade test protocol, the standard now states
that ‘‘the combustion chamber shall be capable of enduring the effects of the test
procedure without itself suffering undue damage or distortion.’’ Only the internal
dimensions are specified. For the test to be representative of a real building (with
windows), the resilience of the fitting around the combustion chamber in the
fac¸ade must match the detail of the cladding system actually used in the real
building. Any deficiencies around the window of a real building, which may be
masked by decorator’s finishings, could allow flames to penetrate the cavity ear-
lier. If the cavity is lined with combustible insulation, breather membranes, and
cladding, the fire performance will be very much worse. Thus, an unrealistically
robust window detail around the combustion chamber in the test could lead to
significant variation between test performance, and fire behaviour in a real build-
ing with a less robust detail.
BS 8414 specifies thermocouples at level 1 and 2, Fig. 1, located at mid-depth of
the insulation, at the mid-depth of the cavity, and protruding 50 ± 5 mm outside
the external face. BS 8414-1 does not specify whether or where cavity barriers (fire
stopping) should be used, although their use is implied by the requirement to
report any failure of such a barrier during the test.
The distances to the thermocouples on the first and second level of 2.5 m and
5.0 m above the combustion chamber are not reflective of actual building floor to
floor heights, which are usually in the range of 2.7 m to 3.3 m. This means that
either the fac¸ade design is modified such that the cladding panels are made shorter
than would normally be used in practice, so that the second set of thermocouples
remain above the cavity barrier, which would normally be at second floor level, or
that the thermocouples are located within the cavity of the first floor, where they
are more likely to reach failure temperature.
The most important is the difference between the test construction and the use
of the test result to confirm compliance on non-identical systems, in real buildings.
Statements, such as the NHBC Guidance [24] that polyethylene-filled ACM with
certain PIR or phenolic foam insulation products, or the UK government tests
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Figure 1. Test set up including thermocouple location.
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showing that ACM with a non-combustible filling in front of PIR foam [25] meet
the requirements set out in AD B ignore the importance of the construction detail.
BR135 states that ‘‘the classification applies only to the system as tested and
detailed in the classification report. The classification report can only cover the
details of the system as tested. This statement was used in Dr Barbara Lane’s
expert witness report to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry who concluded that ‘‘any dif-
ference between the Grenfell Tower rainscreen cladding system and the relevant
supporting fire test evidence when classified with BR135 means the test evidence
cannot be relied on to demonstrate compliance…’’
2.1. Fire Source and Fuel Load
The fire load in BS 8414 is defined by the quantity of timber used to build the
crib. It is nominally 4500 MJ, with peak heat release rate 3.0 ± 0.5 MW. This is
less than the ISO 13785-2 test, and less than many post-flashover room fires. The
test time starts when the heat reaching the fac¸ade causes a temperature rise of
200C, at level 1. It is allowed to burn for 30 min, then the crib is extinguished,
but the fac¸ade may continue to burn. After the crib is extinguished a significant
amount of charred timber remains. However, there is no requirement to calibrate
or quantify either the fuel load or the heat release rate. Further, there is no
attempt to quantify the incident heat flux on the fac¸ade. No rationale is provided
for extinguishing the crib after 30 min.
The tolerances specified in Annex A of BS 8414-1, describing the timber crib
source, allow a minimum and maximum mass of timber and heat release to be
calculated. Annex A specifies the crib as 100 sticks of 50 ± 2 mm 9 50 ± 2 mm
square section and length 1500 ± 5 mm and 150 sticks also of (50 ± 2 mm)2 and
of length 1000 ± 5 mm of pinus sylvestris (Scots pine), of density 0.4 to
0.65 kg dm-3 and moisture content 10% to 15%. This gives a mass of timber of
394 kg (or 344 kg dry weight). However, if all the lower limits are used, a mini-
mum mass of timber of 277 kg (or 236 kg dry weight) is specified, while the upper
limit is 529 kg (or 476 kg dry weight). Taking into account the energy required to
heat (CP) and vaporize (DHvap) the water content, and a heat of combustion of
dry pinus sylvestris of 19.31 MJ kg–1, this gives a lower total heat release of
4529 MJ and an upper value of 9169 MJ. This shows that precise specification of
timber can halve the energy available for the thermal attack on the fac¸ade. This
adds an additional layer of uncertainty to test results.
2.2. The Effects of Ventilation and Wind
Recent research published in Sweden by RISE [26] notes that ‘‘experimental
results […] showed that the fire exposure on the fac¸ade varies in BS 8141-1 […].
This means that it is not possible to control the fire exposure on the fac¸ade sur-
face, and it may differ from test to test due to factors such as air movement
around the combustion chamber and the geometry of the fac¸ade system’’. The
only indicator of fire exposure on the fac¸ade comes from the thermocouples, par-
ticularly those at level 1. In BS 8414, the level 1 thermocouples are used to estab-
lish two test parameters Ts and ts. Ts is the start temperature, defined as the
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average temperature 5 min before ignition. ts is the start time, which is set as zero
when the temperature rise exceeds 200C on any of the level 1 thermocouples,
provided they do so for at least 30 s.
2.3. Panel Joints
In a fac¸ade system, panel joints provide greater susceptibility to attack from fire.
BS 8414-1 specifies that vertical joints should be within 100 mm of the centreline
of the combustion chamber, where the heat flux is likely to be greatest. However,
it also specifies that at least one horizontal joint shall be located 2.4 m above the
combustion chamber opening. This is around the height of the level 1 thermocou-
ples. Although the distance from the top of a window to the first horizontal joint
in the cladding above it varies, it would not be uncommon for a joint to be loca-
ted within a zone that is 1 m or 1.5 m above a window, causing the thermal
attack on the fac¸ade to be more severe.
2.4. Test Construction
BS 8414-1 describes the test set-up ‘‘with the cladding system attached in the man-
ner specified by the test sponsor.’’ There are a variety of different panel types and
panel support options for designers and fabricators to choose from, all of which
can be considered common. Rainscreen panels can be flat and face-fixed to sup-
port rails or they can be folded around their edges and formed into ‘‘cassettes’’
which are ‘‘hooked onto’’ the support rails. The design of the panel support sys-
tem is a function of several factors including the panel type, size, thickness and
wind load. For ‘‘cassette’’ type panels, the interval between fixing positions at the
supporting rails can be as large as  1500 mm.
The test sponsor is most often the product manufacturer, whose interest comes
from their desire to test an assembly, using their materials, that will successfully
meet the acceptance criteria. Once accomplished, they are not in an objective posi-
tion to assess variations from what was actually tested. They may also have signif-
icant know-how to use the design detail of the fac¸ade to optimise its performance
in a test, which might deviate from normal practice on a construction site. Fac¸ade
test construction is undertaken by skilled technicians, usually working for the pro-
duct manufacturer, in ideal conditions, and to very different objectives and time-
scales to those employed on a construction site. The standard does not specify
whether the test laboratory is obliged to observe and monitor the construction.
There does not appear to be any requirement for the test laboratory to provide
information on any of the design details.
2.5. Design Detail
The standard specifies only minimum dimensions of wall height and width. It is
not specified in BS 8414 whether the detail at the top of the wall should represent
an intermediate floor, or the top of the building. This is significant because the
installation of cladding systems at the top of a wall can differ substantially from
that between adjacent storeys. Complex details, e.g. where windows and vents
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need to be fitted into the cladding, and where drainage is provided from the venti-
lated cavity, critically affect fire performance. Their absence shows that the test is
not aimed at replicating an idealized form of reality, but is somewhere between a
component test and a system test for the part of the fac¸ade being tested.
2.6. Cavities
Babrauskas [17] described the discovery in Sweden in 1939, named the Schlyter
effect, of fire growth in cavities within combustible panel systems (sometimes
described as a ‘‘chimney effect’’ today). This effect has been subsequently rediscov-
ered and quantified [27]. For polyurethane foam insulation and gypsum board,
they found a cavity width of 25 mm limited the flame spread to 1–2 m in the con-
figuration they used, while a width of 40 mm allowed flame spread through the
test fac¸ade. For expanded and extruded polystyrene (EPS and XPS) and gypsum
board, melting of the polystyrene widened the cavity so no such correlation was
found. A cavity width of 50 mm, with a polyurethane based foam, such as that
used on Grenfell Tower and in the DCLG tests, may be close to the worst case
for upward fire spread, while fire may have limited penetration of cavities nar-
rower than 25 mm; though further research is required here to establish robust
correlations. This emphasises the need to test the fac¸ade system as constructed,
with even non-combustible elements such as the cavity playing a critical role. The
strong influence of the chimney effect in rainscreen type systems underpins the
need for cavity barriers. The issue of fires within cavities is beginning to be mod-
elled, for example using Fire Dynamics Simulator [28], and compared to experi-
mental observations, in order to develop design approaches for these types of
fires, which are not yet well understood.
2.7. Application of BS 8414 Performance to Fac¸ade Design
The dimensional constraints placed on the BS 8414 test present designers of the
test specimens with a dilemma. It is not possible to ‘‘map’’ a real fac¸ade geometry
onto the BS 8414 rig. Therefore, a test designer has to choose between two
approaches:
1. Adjust the panel sizes and vertical dimensions of the test specimen to corre-
spond to the positions of the thermocouples defined in BS 8414, so that the
cavity barrier sits below the thermocouples. Thus, a level 1 thermocouple
would represent the temperature of the floor above the combustion chamber
and the level 2 thermocouples the temperature two floors above.
OR
2. Maintain representative panel sizes and vertical dimensions for the test speci-
men (as representative of typical arrangement on a real building), without con-
sideration of the position of the thermocouples specified in BS 8414. This
means that the level 2 thermocouples will sit below the cavity barrier corre-
sponding to two floors above the combustion chamber. This would significantly
increase the chance of test failure.
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Neither of the above approaches is satisfactory with respect to representation of
typical cladding systems when applied to real buildings. It seems the first
approach is often adopted, presumably as the designers of test specimens prefer
the favourable arrangement for testing whereby the relative positions of cavity
barriers and thermocouples are considered more important with respect to vertical
fire spread, given that the temperature reading at level 2 will determine whether
the test will pass or fail.
3. The BR 135 Criteria
‘‘Annex A’’ of BR 135 provides the performance criteria in the BS 8414-1 test for
compliance with the UK building regulations for tall, non-residential buildings
such as offices and hotels. The first criterion is that ‘‘the system must have been
tested to the full test-duration requirements of BS 8414-1 without any early termi-
nation of the full fire-load exposure period.’’ BS 8414 requires termination of the
test if flames extend beyond the top of the test rig. Thus, the fac¸ade system will
automatically fail if flames are seen above the test rig during the test. However, as
there is no maximum height of the rig prescribed, those testing in a taller test
facility with a taller sample will be less likely to fail compared to those using a
test sample of minimum height.
The main criterion stated in BR 135 is failure due to external or internal fire
spread, which is deemed to have occurred if the temperature rise above Ts of any
of the thermocouples at level 2 exceeds 600C for a period of at least 30 s, within
15 min of the start time, ts. The failure is reported as external or internal fire
spread, based on the thermocouples affected. In terms of ensuring the prevention
of internal or external fire spread within the fac¸ade there are two significant con-
cerns with a temperature rise as large as 600C, over such a short duration. First,
the majority of widely used polymeric construction materials will ignite below
500C, especially if a pilot flame is present. Items such as window frames and sur-
rounds or vents, which are not included in the test, would be burning if there was
a fire in a real building. This could result in a breach of the compartmentation to
the floor above, before the temperature, 5 m (almost two storeys) above the com-
bustion chamber, had risen by 600C. Second, 15 min is an unrealistically short
fire exposure time: a fire in an apartment or waste container will burn for longer
than this, and it is too short for effective firefighting on a tall building [29]. Since
the test duration is 60 min, if the purpose of the test is to ensure life safety, it
seems unjustifiable for the critical safety parameter of facade fire spread, which is
the rationale for the test, to be disregarded for the remaining 45 min.
BS 8414-1 requires that ‘‘the times of significant events such as the change of
flaming conditions and any change in the mechanical behaviour of the cladding
system shall be recorded, especially the detachment of any part of the cladding
system (whether flaming or otherwise) or any fire penetrations through fire stops
incorporated within the cladding system.’’ However, these test observations are
not included in the BR 135 criteria. Falling debris and burning droplets present
an additional hazard, for firefighters and emergency personnel, as well as people
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evacuating the burning building, or nearby. Burning droplets can also cause sec-
ondary ignition, making firefighting more difficult. BR 135 states that ‘‘mechanical
performance’’ needs to be considered during risk assessment when the fac¸ade tes-
ted to BS 8414 is to be applied to a real high-rise building. The failure of cavity
barriers should be observed during a BS 8414-1 test. However, it is not clear how
either piece of information in the report is made available to risk engineers or end
users, since there is no obligation for the manufacturer to make their test report
public.
4. The UK Government Sponsored Tests
Two months after the Grenfell Tower fire, the UK government’s Department of
Communities and Local Government, now the Ministry of Housing, Communities
and Local Government (MHCLG), asked BRE to undertake a series of tests on
insulated rainscreen fac¸ade systems faced with ACM using the BS 8414-1 test, to
‘‘help building owners make decisions on any further measures that may need to
be put in place [30].’’
These tests are included because detailed test reports have been published, pro-
viding further insight into the regulatory process. The particulars of the design of
the MHCLG sponsored tests, conducted between July and August 2017, are pre-
sented in the introduction of each of the 7 BRE test reports [31], stating ‘‘The
design of the cladding systems have been reviewed by The Independent Expert
Advisory panel and other industry bodies to ensure that they are representative of
the systems that are in common use on buildings including the way they are
fixed.’’
4.1. Design Detail
Each MHCLG test report [31] includes the description ‘‘a pre-fabricated, welded
window pod constructed from 5 mm-thick aluminium was fixed onto the edge of
the combustion chamber opening… The window pod extended 180 mm perpendic-
ular to the masonry wall so that it extended approximately 30 mm beyond the
front face of the finished cladding system.’’ The use of such heavy gauge ‘‘window
pods’’ is not representative of typical construction detailing around windows. The
protrusion by 30 mm of a 5 mm thick aluminium plate around the opening pro-
vides greater protection to the fac¸ade, and especially the cavity, than a typical
window fitting. Since fire penetration into the cavity is one of the main hazards
being assessed, this large shield and heatsink would effectively protect the lower
part of the fac¸ade system, and particularly the vulnerability to fire attack above
the window openings and into the cavity, by acting as a solid cavity barrier. Thus,
a crucial aspect of fac¸ade fire safety not covered by these government tests is fire
entry via the window openings and the perimeter interface around window open-
ings into the cavity.
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4.2. Effect of Ventilation on Fire Growth
There are two BS 8414 test apparatuses located in the burn hall at BRE, known
as test wall 1 and test wall 2. In the tests commissioned by MHCLG at BRE, the
publicly available test reports, show notable differences between the early fire
growth rates from the wooden cribs with faster fire growth occurring consistently
on test wall 2. A similar effect was reported from the RISE/Zagreb tests [26, 32],
when run outside on days with different wind speeds.
Table 2 shows significant variation in the time taken from ts for the tempera-
ture to reach 300C at level 2. At this low temperature rise and short exposure
time, the fac¸ade products have not contributed to the temperature rise, so the
variation results only from the fire growth rate of the burning cribs. The second
and third columns show this time for the level 2 thermocouples in the MHCLG
tests [31]. This shows both a random variation, and a systematic difference
between the fire growth rates, with test wall 2 reaching 300 C in half the time, on
average. If such variation occurs in the same burn hall of a single test laboratory
with the test walls alternated in sequence, it raises questions about the intra- and
inter-laboratory reproducibility of the Standard. It may be that the two test walls
are subject to different environmental ventilation, although there is a requirement
in BS 8414 that the air velocity at the start of the test, at level 2, should be less
than 2 ± 0.5 m s-1. The UK government reports do not include air velocity data.
The fourth and fifth columns of Table 2 show the time taken for the temperature
to reach 300C in the tests undertaken by RISE in Zagreb [26, 32]. The test wall
was located outside, with the first three tests being conducted in spring, with a
wind speed between 2 m s-1 and 5 m s-1 and the last three tests in summer, with
Table 2
Time to Reach 300C in UK Government Tests [31] and in RISE Tests
[26]
Test number
Time to reach 300C at Level 2 Thermocouples
MHCLG tests RISE/Zagreb tests*
Test Wall 1 Test Wall 2
Wind speed
0–2 m s-1
Wind speed
2–5 m s-1
1 270 107
2 100 136
3 200 133
4 135 189
5 350 390
6 200 330
7 320 – –
Average 285 145 303 126
SD 57 41 103 16
*Temperature readings between RISE and MHCLG are not comparable
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a wind speed varying between 0 m s-1 and 2 m s-1. The average time taken to
reach 300C for the windier condition is 42% of that for the stiller air condition.
The first three Zagreb tests were not compliant with the BS 8414 limit, while the
last three were compliant. RISE reported temperatures, measured using plate ther-
mocouples 0.5 m in front of the top of the wood crib, rather than protruding
from level 2, so direct comparison with MHCLG tests is not possible.
Other studies, using a propane burner as the fire source have shown the effect
of wind both normal [33], and parallel [34, 35] to the fac¸ade to lessen the intensity
of the thermal attack. In the case of a timber crib, wind will have a strong accel-
erating effect in the initial fire growth rate. Delichatsios [36] describes the classic
model of fac¸ade flame height as needing revision. When a compartment undergoes
transition to under-ventilated flaming, this reduces the temperature within the
compartment but increases the temperature outside leading to more severe fac¸ade
fires.
4.3. Relative Location of Cavity Barriers and Thermocouples
The UK government tests included 3 vertical cavity barriers [37], within a total
fac¸ade width of 4 m, shown in Fig. 2. The spacing of cavity barriers in a typical
building—Grenfell Tower is used as an example—is shown alongside. According
to AD B, the maximum distance between vertical cavity barriers is 20 m for prod-
ucts of lower reaction to fire classification; for Euroclass D materials and below,
the separation is reduced to 10 m. At the time of the test, the PIR, phenolic and
ACM were all classified as Euroclass C or above, so the 20 m separation rule
applies. In residential buildings, the cavity barriers would usually be located only
at the property walls and floors between apartments, and around windows and
other openings into the fac¸ade such as vent flues. Thus, there were twice as many
vertical cavity barriers in the MHCLG sponsored tests than would be required by
AD B, for a typical apartment of width of 8 m. As well as the vertical cavity bar-
riers, in the UK government tests, 4 horizontal barriers were installed at intervals
of approximately 2.3 m within the 6.5 m fac¸ade section above the fire chamber.
The cavity barriers were of a higher specification in the UK government tests
than the minimum recommended performance in AD B, i.e. fire resistance of EI
90/30 (provides 90 min integrity and 30 min insulation) for the vertical and hori-
zontal cavity barriers, when AD B would only expect a fire resistance of EI 30/15
(30 min integrity and 15 min insulation) to be provided for cavity barriers. Thus,
the fire-stopping capacity of the barriers used in the government test have three
times longer integrity and twice the insulation time as those normally required.
BS 8414 defines a fixed position of the level 1 and level 2 thermocouples relative
to the combustion chamber. The level 1 and level 2 thermocouples are respectively
2500 mm and 5000 mm above the top of the combustion chamber. This presents
designers of BS 8414 test specimens with an unrealistic constraint because the
thermocouple positions are not representative of a typical building geometry. Typ-
ical building geometries include floor-to-floor heights that are ‡ 3000 mm so the
spacing between the level 1 and level 2 thermocouples is not the floor-to-floor
height. The combustion chamber represents the position of a window opening, the
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distance from the top of a window opening on a typical building to the level of a
floor above is usually 500 to 1000 mm, significantly less than the 2500 mm separa-
tion to the level 1 thermocouples specified in BS 8414. For the level 1 thermocou-
ples to be at the height of the floor above, with respect to the top of the
combustion chamber (e.g. top of the window), would typically be less than
1000 mm.
From the information presented in the reports, it appears that the level 2 cavity
thermocouples were located just above the cavity barriers. In BS 8414-1, the level
2 thermocouple location is specified as 5000 mm above the combustion chamber,
while the drawings show the 75 mm cavity barriers being located somewhere
above 4660 mm. Since the cavity barriers would normally be installed at floor
level, to protect each apartment from fire spread from below, this represents an
unrealistically small floor-to-floor height of 2330 mm. The relative positions have
been illustrated in Fig. 3. This will have the effect of helping to meet the BR 135
test criterion of reducing the temperature rise at the level 2 thermocouples (partic-
Figure 2. Cavity barriers shown in red in MHCLG tests [47], and on
a typical building (Grenfell Tower is used as an example), drawn to
approximately the same scale.
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ularly if the intumescent cavity barriers expand fully, as stated in the test reports),
in such a way that would not exist in a real building.
Figure 3. Relative positions of cavity barrier and level 2
thermocouples in the MHCLG tests.
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Figure 4. Alternative facade test apparatus, undergoing evaluation
by European Commission.
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5. Discussion
The BS 8414 tests and the BR 135 criteria are the route by which combustible
material is permitted on the external walls of tall buildings in the UK. This paper
has shown that this pass/fail approach in a single test does not provide the neces-
sary assurances that meeting the test criteria will ensure fire safety. The role of the
BS 8414 test in facilitating the use of combustible materials in high-rise buildings
has been the subject of significant criticism following the Grenfell tragedy [38].
Professor Jose Torero, an expert witness to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, has
warned [39] that ‘‘many details can be hidden within the results of the test’’.
‘‘Tests such as BS 8414 provide a single scenario deemed consistent with an exter-
nal fire, a very limited number of measurements and a very simple failure crite-
rion. The combination of these three characteristics does not provide a sufficiently
comprehensive assessment of performance.’’ There are several parameters that are
not adequately considered in the Standard, and the criteria for compliance with
UK Building Regulations do not correspond to the performance requirement that
‘‘the external walls of the building shall adequately resist the spread of fire over
the walls […], having regard to the height, use and position of the building’’.
Using the example of the seven tests sponsored by the MHCLG, it is clear that
much more detail is necessary within BS 8414 to precisely specify the fac¸ade sys-
tems, so that their fire performance will be replicated on real buildings. The cur-
rent BR 135 criteria do not ensure that any combustible components will have the
capability to ‘‘adequately resist the spread of fire over the walls’’.
The current work highlights the ambiguities and lack of reproducibility of many
aspects of the BS 8414 tests. In particular, it has been shown that it is possible to
change the severity of the test conditions by careful adjustment of particular
parameters, while still being compliant with the test protocol. The wood itself pro-
vides a significant source of irreproducibility, with the potential to halve the heat
release from the burning crib by precise specification of the fuel. The greater fire
growth rate, believed to result from differences in ventilation on BRE’s test wall 2,
located inside the burn hall, are a cause for concern. Effectively doubling the fire
growth rate of the wood crib results in very different conditions for tests falling
within the standard protocol, particularly if the threshold to a pass/fail is only
counted within the first 15 min. It has been suggested [22] that a constant heat
output fuel source (probably a gas burner) would be far more effective in ensuring
consistency of results, and would eliminate these two problems.
The use of an unrepresentatively large number of cavity barriers, or a heavy-
duty window pod are entirely permissible within the BS 8414 tests, but leaves sig-
nificant untested vulnerabilities in real buildings. The relative positioning of ther-
mocouples and cavity barriers needs to be explicitly stated. Fire growth within the
cavity will be underestimated when the thermocouples are shielded by the cavity
barrier. Flaming will be suppressed at the top of the rig if an additional unrepre-
sentative cavity barrier is installed at its exit.
The failure criteria in BR 135 for the temperature rise on level 2 thermocouples
exceeding 600C, for a period of at least 30 s, within 15 min of the start of the
test lack any scientific basis and are not adequate to ensure fire safety. It is hard
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to understand why the BR135 criteria do not make use of the temperatures at
levels 1 and 2 for the full hour of the test. The rationale for, revised and more rig-
orous criteria, need to be made explicit so that designers can evaluate if and how
these apply to their specific building configuration. Debris, molten and burning
droplets falling from the fire scene must be reported in such a way that the risk
assessor is fully aware of them; this should include photographs of the area below
the test rig; records of the debris composition (mass and size); and a description in
the timeline of when such events occur.
The methodology of the BS 8414 and the BR 135 criteria as an approval system
for cladding on tall buildings excludes features found on typical buildings, such as
windows, vents and other construction details that can enhance the spread of fire.
Thus, to meet the UK Building Regulations, separate assessments of the effects of
such detail on the overall fire performance should also be undertaken. In meeting
the BR 135 criteria, only the fire performance of the fac¸ade system without win-
dows or vents has been assessed.
5.1. Insulation
In many respects, the current BS 8414 test for rainscreen systems could be descri-
bed as an assessment of the effectiveness of the cladding to protect the underlying
combustible insulation. As early as 1986, a paper sponsored by the International
Isocyanate Institute [40] recognised the dangers of rigid polyurethane insulation.
Polyisocyanurate (PIR) is a rigid polyurethane based polymer which is enhanced
by the formation of isocyanurate rings within its structure, by using an excess of
isocyanate in the resin formulation, improving its fire performance. The former
Technical Director of the PIR manufacturer, Celotex, described how PIR has
changed over the last 20 years due to a price increase of the main raw material,
isocyanate [41]. Early PIRs contained more than twice the ratio of isocyanate to
polyol than the current products, which rely on flame retardants to pass the regu-
latory tests.
In the wake of the Grenfell Tower fire an industry sponsored initiative pub-
lished results of tests using ISO 13785-1 [42]. The 100 kW burner did little more
than penetrate the ACM, irrespective of whether it was filled with polyethene
(PE), fire retarded polyethene, or non-combustible filling. For the ACM_PE, they
reported that the insulants contributed little to the combustion, and this contribu-
tion probably stopped after destruction of the cladding. This simple set of tests
has been used as the basis for modelling, and developed into a larger project used
to justify a model of the Grenfell Tower fire [43, 44] in which the insulation made
a negligible contribution to the flame spread. Another study has shown significant
contributions from the burning insulation, in an estimate of the overall fac¸ade
burning behaviour [45].
Professor Jose´ Torero, as an expert witness to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, has
specifically cited the risks of combustible insulation and the inadequacy of BS
8414 in accounting for those risks [39]. Professor Torero remarks, ‘‘A critical
aspect that is missed by BS 8414 and observations is the burn-out of the insula-
tion material […] the insulation has the potential to burn for a much longer time
A Critical Appraisal of the UK’s Regulatory Regime for Combustible Fac¸ades
period [than the cladding]. The duration of localized burning will be critical when
defining the capacity of these fires to break back into the building’’. Professor
Torero further observes that ‘‘the fire source, the focus on flame spread and dura-
tion of the test in BS 8414 all mask the role of the insulation and over emphasize
the role of the rain-screen. None address the burn-out times and their role in sus-
taining localized burning’’.
It is a matter of some concern that problems associated with the current test
regime were absent from the test method proposed originally [23]. This brings into
question the drivers behind, and motivation for, reducing the effectiveness of the
standard. Given the understandable anger surrounding the Grenfell tragedy, there
is a need to fully understand how these changes came about.
6. Conclusions
The process by which combustible fac¸ades are permitted on tall buildings in Eng-
land does not ensure fire safety. In the light of the Grenfell Tower tragedy, discus-
sion of a new and more robust approach is required. This paper is a contribution
to that debate. It is limited in scope to the BS 8414 test standards, the criteria in
Annex A of BR 135, and the MHCLG sponsored tests. It is clear that ambiguities
within BS 8414 have created a test protocol which is far from reproducible, where
potential changes from fail to pass can result from random variation or judicious
optimisation of the experimental parameters. The criteria in BR 135 do not
appear to align with any specific fire safety objectives, and cannot be considered
to confer compliance with the UK Building Regulations. While the MHCLG tests
are the first publicly available series of large scale fac¸ade fire tests, they were not
sufficiently representative of the fac¸ades on buildings in the UK.
The clear and obvious short-term solution to the fire safety of fac¸ades problem
is to prohibit the use of combustible materials on the exterior faces of tall build-
ings. The ‘‘combustibles ban’’ has achieved this for residential buildings con-
structed or renovated after February 2019. However, this leaves a large number of
existing tall buildings, and a very large number of residential units, in an unfortu-
nate position where they would not be compliant with current fire safety regula-
tions. This has raised such serious concerns about the fire safety that it has
resulted in mental trauma for occupants, and prevented the sale of apartments in
tall buildings, because of the uncertainties around the fire safety status of their
fac¸ades.
In order to re-establish public confidence and occupant safety, if large-scale
tests were to continue to have a role in conferring compliance, it would first be
necessary to further develop the large-scale test, so that it is more scientific, with
demonstrable quantitative measurements and reproducibility, and its results evalu-
ated against realistic acceptance criteria that help to designers and clients make
informed decisions on fire safety. If it were considered expedient to revise the
large-scale test methodology to quantify the fire threat from existing combustible
facades, and if the BS 8414 test protocol were to be considered the most appropri-
ate starting point, there are important areas that require further research and test-
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ing. These include the effects of differences between the design of the test speci-
mens and the many design variables that occur in actual buildings, and the effects
of differences in design and fabrication for a BS 8414 test, and construction prac-
tice in real buildings. Only when these effects have been properly quantified can
the results of a BS 8414 test be of any value to ensuring the fire safety of a build-
ing.
In view of the continued lack of confidence in the current regulatory process,
and the global interest in how the UK will address the problem of combustible
fac¸ades, if the standard were to continue to exist in any form, it would also be
necessary to address the following.
1. Fuel source The inconsistency associated with a fuel source whose heat release
is not monitored or controlled leads to wide variation in test performance.
Replacing the timber cribs with a regulated gas burner and heat flux meters on
the facade would ensure that all facade tests were subject to the same thermal
attack.
2. Test construction For the tests to be of value to fac¸ade and fire safety engi-
neers, the precise details of the test specimen construction must be available.
These should be observed and recorded by the test laboratory and presented in
the certification report. The relative position of cavity barriers and thermocou-
ples must be clearly defined and aligned to specific fire safety objectives. The
surrounding to the combustion chamber, intended to represent a post-flashover
apartment, should have the window surround that would be used in the actual
construction, not a heavy-duty aluminium pod.
3. Full-scale experimental investigation into the effects of different construction
detailing between tests and real buildings Fac¸ade designers and specifiers need to
know how details such as windows, interface details around windows, vents,
breather membranes, fac¸ade fixings and cavity barrier positions will behave in
a real fire. The incorporation of windows and vents into the BS 8414 test
would significantly widen the assurance of fire safety provided by the test, and
allow features such as windows and vents to be optimised to maximize fire
safety.
4. Revised criteria The criteria in BR 135 need urgent revision to be aligned with
specific fire safety objectives. With the exception of metals, such as aluminium
or magnesium, there are probably no combustible construction products in
common use with ignition temperatures exceeding 600C. The current criteria
would allow all combustible materials to ignite within 15 min, 5 m above the
flashover apartment and still be compliant. This is inconsistent with any con-
servative fire safety objective. If the temperature was kept below 400C for
60 min, below the cavity barrier, there may be a reasonable expectation that
the fac¸ade would be effective in suppressing vertical fire spread for many con-
struction products of lower flammability. Given the diversity of high-rise build-
ings, from offices and luxury accommodation to social housing, care homes
and hospitals, instituting a range of performance criteria, of increasing fire
safety, rather than a single pass/fail result would give designers and engineers
A Critical Appraisal of the UK’s Regulatory Regime for Combustible Fac¸ades
more information on uncertainty and risk, and regulators more scope to deliver
the highest levels of fire safety to the most vulnerable. Detailed reports of fall-
ing debris must be included in the final classification report and made publicly
available. Architects, fire safety engineers and fire and rescue services all need
detailed warnings of the potential for falling debris to protect personnel and
ensure safe evacuation.
5. Public access to information about passed and failed tests There is currently no
obligation for test sponsors or test laboratories to publish any information
about tests that have not satisfied the performance criteria. Public access to this
information is a crucial ingredient to improve awareness, trust and cultural
attitudes in the industry. The very valuable recent study of fac¸ade fire test data
[19] used data from a test laboratory in Poland (presumably because none was
publicly available elsewhere). In her report to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, Dr
Lane observed [46] that
‘‘The absence of a body of relevant fire test evidence for rainscreen cladding
systems, and the components of rainscreen cladding systems, based on the cur-
rent submissions to the Public Inquiry, show a serious failing in the testing and
certification regime. A body of publicly available and relevant fire test evidence
is urgently required to support common construction forms.’’
It is recongnised that test sponsors make significant investment in undertak-
ing large scale testing, however, this should not present a barrier to establishing
an appropriate mechanism for knowledge sharing which is in the interest of
public safety.
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Appendix
In view of the above conclusions it is worth noting that the ‘‘alternative’’ fac¸ade
test proposal, currently under consideration by the European Commission (EC)
addresses many of these concerns. The alternative proposal was included in a con-
sortium report to the EC in June 2018, alongside the EC’s preferred route of
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adopting the large-scale BS 8414 test for high-risk applications and the intermedi-
ate scale DIN 4102-20 test for lower fire safety classification. 18 of 28 member
countries of the European Union favoured the alternative proposal and the EC
have now launched a tender to undertake an interlaboratory reproducibility study
(round-robin) on the alternative test method [13].
The alternative method has been described as a merger of BS 8414 and DIN
4102-20, but the proposal addresses many of the deficiencies in BS 8414. The pro-
posed test rig, shown in Fig. 4 is 8.5 m tall and has interchangeable combustion
chambers of 2.2 m (width) 2.0 m (height) x 1.0 m (depth) for the large-scale test,
and 1 m x 1 m x 0.8 m for the intermediate-scale test. It also has a window open-
ing, partly above the large-scale combustion chamber. It specifies that the details
around the opening are representative of those used in practice for the system
under test. The window opening is located so that it is partly, but not completely
above the combustion chamber, to test the reaction to fire behaviour of the
fac¸ade, and of the window detail. The proposal states that gas would be prefer-
able as a fuel, but if wood is used, then the heat flux should be monitored using
plate thermocouples above the combustion chamber, and at the secondary open-
ing, and the mass loss rate of the wood crib should be investigated during the
round-robin trial. If timber cribs are to be used, it is necessary to define the tim-
ber species, density, dimensional tolerances, finish (sawn or planed) and condition-
ing. It proposes a 3 MW wood crib similar to that in BS 8414 for the large-scale
test, extinguished after 30 min, and a 30 kg fan-assisted wood crib for the inter-
mediate scale test, extinguished after 22 min. In both cases the test is terminated
after 60 min. Falling debris should be observed visually, in the absence of a suit-
able, more robust method for its quantification.
Four limited fire spread (LS) classifications have been proposed. LS1 and LS2
are based on BS 8414 and LS3 and LS4 are based on DIN 4102-20, and sum-
marised in Table 3. The criteria for all the classifications are that no thermocouple
should show a temperature rise greater than 500C, over the 60 min of the test.
LS1 and LS3 have the additional criteria that there must be no falling debris
(which is currently defined as less than: 1 kg; 0.1 m2; or 10 burning drops). In
general, the higher classification exempts testing for the lower classifications
although LS2 will not exempt a test from LS3. The test report includes construc-
Table 3
Summary of Classifications Proposed for the European ‘‘Alternative‘‘
Facade Test [21]
Classification Scale of test Maximum temperature rise Falling parts/burning debris
LS1 Large Pass Fail
LS2 Large Pass Pass
LS3 Intermediate Pass Fail
LS4 Intermediate Pass Pass
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tion detail and a description of the debris. However, it does not specify that the
test report must be made publicly available.
Although this proposal has significant improvements on BS 8414 it still lacks a
scientific basis, or input from the lessons learnt from the catastrophic facade fires
of the last decade. For example, while the criteria of 500C temperature rise of
over the full 60 min of the test represent a fire safety improvement, the ignition
temperature of most combustible materials is below 500C and the strength of any
aluminium support structures would be significantly reduced if a real facade were
to reach this temperature. If items such as vents or breather membranes were pre-
sent in the real building, but absent from the test, their influence on the fire per-
formance of the actual fac¸ade would remain unquantified.
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